The Treasury's Entity is seen as a Citigroup bailout by lot of people for the very simple reason that it is a Citigroup bailout. That might not be the only thing it is, but stupid is as stupid does, and one thing this stupid thing does (or will do, if it ever gets off the ground) is bailout Citigroup, which is reportedly on the hook for as much as $80 billion from it’s four mammoth SIVs. Since the fund could buy Citigroup's SIVs, it would reduce the amount that Citigroup would need to write off. And reducing write-offs is something Citi desperately wants to do right now.

There’s at least a fair amount of quiet clapping about the Treasury Department’s role in creating the Entity. Citigroup, some say, is too big to fail, and the Treasury Department should step in to prevent the kind of financial market disorder that would come from the toppling of the towering financial giant.

But this kind of logic has some rethinking the wisdom of the financial regulatory reforms that allowed banks such as Citi to grow so large in the first place. When lawmakers reformed depression era laws that stood in the way of these financial super-markets, they tended to sound libertarian notes about allowing financial innovation and the operation of the free market to control the size and scope of Wall Street firms. The era of government planning was over. So the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which had separated investment houses from commercial banks—most famously requiring JP Morgan to part from Morgan Stanley—was changed to permit the growth of the universal banks.

Many now think that the universal bank is a failed strategy. From Citi to Merrill to Bear Stearns, there are calls for Wall Street firms to slim down, break-up and concentrate on the core businesses that made them wealthy and famous to begin with. But was it a failure? If growing into financial giants allowed them to unilaterally acquire a secret—and nearly costless—government insurance policy, it seems like a great gamble. The executives and shareholders get the upside, while the broader public insures against failure.

“What a scam that is,” writes William Greider in The Nation.

And it’s a scam the Greider thinks is over. Banking regulation will inevitably make a big comeback, he predicts.

“At least the unambiguous truth about ‘financial modernization’ is now on the table for all to see,” he writes. “That should keep the Wall Street guys from whining for a while about the oppressive nature of bank regulation. The next reform era, when it does finally arrive, will head in the opposite direction--restoring public protections for the little guys against the greedy excesses of big hogs.”

What Greider doesn’t mention is that this era of new regulations might be coming too late. Or, rather, right on time, depending on your point of view. Resistance to a new wave of banking regulation requiring bank breakups and dividing Wall Street according to regulatory fiats rather than market demand is likely to be weak in an era when many think the financial supermarket model has failed and should be abandoned. No-one expends much time, money or energy defending a right to do something they don’t want to do anyway. What’s more, there will be plenty of money made by investment bankers spinning-off, selling and acquiring the fragments they are shoring up against the ruins of the toppled giants. Some of these people may actually be the same ones who made fortunes building the giants.

And we’ll all raise a glass to the only saloon in town where it’s never last call: the Wall Street punch bowl.

Piranhas are nasty little fish known for their sharp teeth and an aggressive appetite for meat and flesh. And today the Commodity Futures Trading Commission announced that it had hooked one of the little buggers.

In a case first brought by the the CFTC in May, a federal court in California has fined Robert Joseph Beasley and his firm, Longboat Global Funds Management, for committing fraud by misrepresenting certain investments held by his commodity pool, Piranha Capital. The CFTC claimed the defendants had Piranha Capital loan $4 million to other Beasley controlled entities without letting investors know that Beasley was running them. They say Beasley misled investors about the security of the loans, and then didn’t collect interest or principal on them. He then allegedly used the value of the unpaid interest payment to calculate his fees. Nice work if you can get it. And not get caught.

The order imposes restitution totaling $13.8 million, of which Beasley is responsible for $4.5 million. The order also requires Beasley to pay a $500,000 civil monetary penalty and Longboat to pay a $1 million penalty.

“One has to wonder about a firm that names itself after a flesh eating fish,” the hedge fund newsletter FinAlertnatives quips.

The resignation today of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has ignited speculation about who might fill the top spot at the Justice Department. On Wall Street some are wondering whether the Gonzales’ resignation might help or hurt investment banks, brokerages and corporate America on a number of pending legal issues.

The Justice Department handles more than just the prosecutions of organized criminals, drug dealers and terrorists. It is also involved in law-enforcement in the finance community and corporate America. Chief among the legal issues that concern Wall Street is so-called ‘scheme-liability,’ where banks may be found guilty for assisting the corporate fraud of their clients. Wall Street is also concerned with other issues of institutional liability, for instance whether to prosecute an entire company or an individual when fraud is alleged by executives and employees. Wall Street firms are generally friendly towards insider trading prosecutions, except perhaps when prosecutors get zealously creative and go after financiers whose acts are not widely thought of as illegal.

Under Gonzales, the Justice Department has had a mixed record on Wall Street issues. Gonzales himself, a former corporate lawyer whose list of clients once included Enron, is viewed as having a generally pro-business outlook. Some critics, who asked not to be named for fear of political or legal retaliation, dispute this.

“He’s pro-successful business,” one critic said. “But if your company is in trouble, his Justice department made no bones about going after you.”

The Department has aggressively prosecuted the folks its lawyers like to call ‘wrong-doers,’ including accountants who helped clients develop aggressive tax-avoidance structures, executives involved in back-dating and a host of others involved in the business scandals of the late nineties and early part of this decade. Since Gonzales ran into trouble following revelations of the firing of several government lawyers, many have seen the department as “rudderless.”

“It’s been an asylum run by inmates,” said one court observer.

There is a widespread view on Wall Street that career government prosecutors tend to be more hostile to business than political appointees with more experience in the private sector. There is a fear that a “rudderless” Justice department will drift into a more aggressive current for prosecuting alleged wrong-doing by corporate executives and Wall Street financiers. The hope on Wall Street is that Gonzales’ replacement will be named quickly and come from a background that displays some sympathy for business.

Several names are being talked about as potential nominees. The Wall Street Journal’s Law Blog has a great rundown of the likely suspects. Whether this will be a boon or a bane for Wall Street firms will likely depend on who President George Bush appoints to replace Gonzales, and how quickly that appointment is made. As the day goes on, we’ll profile some of the leading candidates for the job.